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THE CRADLE OF THE
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth).
John W. Compton2
Political scientists and law professors have been debating
over the normative implications of judicial review for the better
part of six decades. The contours of the discussion took shape in
the early 1960s, following the publication of Alexander Bickel’s
The Least Dangerous Branch.3 Bickel’s book launched a stillvibrant critical tradition that characterizes judicial review as an
anomalous, “countermajoritarian force” in the American
constitutional system.4 On this view, the courts’ power to
invalidate democratically enacted statutes gives rise to a
normative conundrum that is not easily resolved: How can “the
people” be said to rule if their preferred policies—or those
enacted by their representatives—are subject to veto by an
unelected and unaccountable judiciary?
At roughly the same time that Bickel was formulating what
came to be known as “the countermajoritarian difficulty,” the
political scientist Robert Dahl proposed a remarkably simple
answer to Bickel’s puzzle: So long as federal judges were
appointed and confirmed by politicians affiliated with a durable
partisan regime, there was little reason to fear that the judiciary’s
constitutional vision would, for any significant length of time, be
at odds with the policy views of electoral majorities.5 The
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
2. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Chapman
University.
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
4. Id. at 16.
5. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
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possibility of unelected judges thwarting the will of the people
might be troubling in theory, but in practice it was likely to occur
only rarely—for example, in the interim between the rise of a new
dominant party coalition and the departure of the old regime’s
judges.
Both Bickel and Dahl’s accounts have come in for serious
criticism in recent years, but they continue to define the terms of
the debate—at least for the moment. In his provocative new book,
Repugnant Laws, Keith Whittington argues that both perspectives
are marred by flawed understandings of the political dynamics
surrounding judicial review, and that scholars would be well
advised to move beyond them. This is an audacious claim, but it
gains credibility from a remarkable new dataset, compiled by
Whittington himself, consisting of every case in which the
Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of a federal
statute, either in whole or in part. The end result is perhaps the
most comprehensive guide to the actual practice of judicial review
ever produced. Seen in its entirety, Whittington argues, the record
of the Court’s interactions with Congress suggests that Dahl’s
framework is useful but overly simplistic, while Bickel’s is so
divorced from reality as to be of little use at all (pp. 6, 9, 301–302).
On the first point, Whittington is entirely persuasive. Indeed,
the evidence presented in Repugnant Laws should lay to rest,
once and for all, the conception of the Supreme Court as the
handmaiden of political parties. Relying on a combination of data
analysis and narrative treatments of important Court decisions,
Whittington shows that the Court has been neither as friendly to
the dominant party nor as hostile to the out-of-power party as
Dahl led his readers to expect. Although constitutional
jurisprudence has undoubtedly evolved in tandem with changes in
the party system, Whittington concludes that “[t]he justices are
not lapdogs, and they have often bitten the hand of the party that
placed them on the bench” (p. 291).
But if Whittington succeeds in debunking, or at least
seriously modifying, Dahl’s framework, his attempt to sketch an
alternative resolution to the countermajoritarian dilemma is less
convincing. The problem, in short, is that a dataset documenting
the history of the Court’s interactions with Congress is a better
instrument for testing Dahl’s relatively specific empirical
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
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predictions than for evaluating Bickel’s more sweeping,
fundamentally normative concerns. As I argue below, the lack of
fit between Whittington’s methodology and his normative
defense of judicial review is on full display in his chapters on the
Lochner era—an era he aptly describes as “the cradle of the
countermajoritarian difficulty” (p. 173). Knowing that the phrase
“Lochner Court” has long served as shorthand for “judicial
overreach,” he sets out to show that the early-twentieth-century
Court was neither as inflexible nor as anti-democratic as its many
critics, including Bickel, have alleged. But the results are
ultimately unpersuasive. Aside from demonstrating that the
Court invalidated federal laws at a lower rate than conventional
wisdom might lead one to expect, Repugnant Laws does little to
absolve the Lochner Court of the charges of unpredictability and
unprincipled decision-making that initially earned it the
opprobrium of legal scholars and historians.
I.
Conventional accounts of the Lochner era—roughly
speaking, the period between the mid-1890s and the New Deal—
describe an all-or-nothing struggle between popular majorities
determined to mitigate the human cost of industrialization and a
judiciary bent on protecting corporations and the wealthy from
the democratic mob. In recent years, however, this familiar
narrative has come under increasing scrutiny from scholars
determined to rehabilitate the Lochner Court’s image.6
Repugnant Laws, which devotes the better part of two lengthy
chapters to this period, clearly belongs in the revisionist camp. Yet
Whittington’s aims are somewhat different than those of other
recent revisionists. Instead of attempting to revive specific
doctrines (such as dual federalism and economic due process) that
flourished during the Lochner era, he challenges the broader
characterization of the early twentieth-century Court as an
erratic, unprincipled, and generally destabilizing force in the

6. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2012); BARRY M. CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION (1998); 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (1993);
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
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constitutional order. Seen in their entirety, he argues, the Lochner
Court’s interactions with Congress reveal a tribunal that steered
a cautious middle course between upholding inherited
constitutional commitments and accommodating the political
demands of the present—a tribunal that salvaged what it could of
nineteenth-century constitutional norms, but “rarely, if ever” at
the expense of alienating “a clear majority of elected officials” (p.
148).
Whittington begins his defense of the Lochner Court by
marshaling an array of quantitative evidence to show that the
Court was more accommodating of Progressive legislative
reforms than is usually believed. Prior to William Howard Taft’s
appointment as Chief Justice in 1921, he points out, the rate at
which the Court invalidated federal laws was only slightly higher
than in earlier historical periods (when taking into account
Congress’s increased statutory output), and many invalidated
provisions were so insignificant as to make little impression on
either Congress or the public (pp. 146–150). This is an important
insight, and one that seems incontestable based on the evidence
presented here. Yet Whittington’s claims grow more tendentious
as he moves from discussing the relative frequency of judicial
invalidations to discussing these decisions’ broader implications
for constitutional theory. His larger argument, it soon becomes
clear, is that even the Lochner Court’s most notorious rulings—
those that struck down important federal laws, and for reasons
contemporaries found difficult to square with received doctrine—
have been wrongly characterized as countermajoritarian.
Put more concretely, Whittington’s thesis is that the Lochner
Court reserved its landmark invalidations for cases where: (1) the
law in question was widely viewed as constitutionally flawed; and
(2) the sponsoring party was itself internally divided about either
the wisdom or constitutionality of the statute (p. 151). Hence,
while decisions striking down federal child labor or minimum
wage laws may have come as a shock to left-leaning
contemporaries, they were fully in keeping with the spirit of
principled pragmatism that governed the Court’s decision-making
in this period. Believing that the challenged laws transgressed
clear constitutional boundaries and that they lacked the support
of mobilized partisan majorities, the justices took the opportunity
to shore up threatened constitutional boundaries where they
could. And—crucially—this was not a solo effort. Rather, the
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Lochner-era justices “worked hand in hand with the conservative
political leaders in both parties to realize a common constitutional
vision of limited government within a decentralized federal
system” (p. 148).
If the Lochner Court was motivated by coherent
constitutional commitments and attentive to the contemporary
political environment, then one would be hard pressed to deny
Whittington’s conclusion that the “countermajoritarian
framework provides little leverage for evaluating the normative
foundations of judicial review during [the Lochner] period” (p.
173). But does his account of Lochner-era judicial decisionmaking square with the historical record? To answer the question,
we must look more closely at the circumstances surrounding
Whittington’s list of important federal measures felled by judicial
review.
Whittington observes that the Fuller and White Courts
handed down five decisions invalidating or limiting federal laws
that were of great interest to contemporary voters and politicians:
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust I & II (1895),7 U.S. v. E.C.
Knight Co. (1895),8 Employers’ Liability Cases (1908),9 and
Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)10 (pp. 164–165). (Several other
controversial decisions invalidating federal laws, including Adair
v. U.S. (1908),11 are relegated to a section on “less important
measures” (pp. 164–165).) He discusses each of these cases at
some length, and in each case concludes that the invalidated
provision was both constitutionally suspect (in the view of
prominent contemporary commentators) and opposed by a
significant faction of the enacting party. The Populist-inspired
income tax provisions invalidated in Pollock, for example, were
initially denounced (on both constitutional and policy grounds)
by Conservative Northeasterners from both parties, including
President Grover Cleveland. When the Court invalidated them, it
was not defying the clearly expressed will of an electoral majority,
but rather reining in a regionally powerful movement (Populism)
whose central aims were of dubious constitutionality (pp. 158–

7. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
8. United States v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
9. Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
10. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
11. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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160).
Aside from the reversal of the regional dynamics, the story
was much the same in Hammer v. Dagenhart. Many prominent
commentators, including President Woodrow Wilson,
condemned proposals for a federal child labor law as
unconstitutional (though Wilson eventually reversed his
position), while Southern manufacturers viewed them as
handouts to their Northeastern competitors (who faced higher
production costs as a result of state child labor bans). Whittington
thus concludes that Hammer, like Pollock, merely blocked a
politically divisive constitutional experiment; it did not defy the
clearly expressed will of the American people (pp. 160–161, 181–
182).
Moving on to the Taft Court, Whittington acknowledges that
the Court began invalidating federal laws at a faster clip in the
1920s, yet he insists that most of the invalidated measures were
politically insignificant. Indeed, only two Taft Court decisions “fit
neatly” into the familiar narrative of a Court committed to
blocking broadly popular Progressive economic reforms (p. 181).
The first, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922),12 barred Congress
from using its taxing power to restrict child labor; the second,
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923),13 invalidated a federal
minimum wage law for women and children in the District of
Columbia. Even in these cases, however, Whittington contends
that the countermajoritarian narrative conceals crucial aspects of
the story. He notes that the child labor tax, like the earlier child
labor law, was of greater interest to “New England
manufactur[ers]” than to the general public, and both it and the
D.C. minimum wage law were widely regarded as constitutionally
suspect (p. 182). No less than the White and Fuller Courts, then,
the Taft Court seems to have shied away from dramatic
confrontations with Congress, acting to curb the growing
regulatory state only in cases where the odds of a sustained
political backlash were remote.
Taken individually, these historical claims are undoubtedly
valid, but it is far from clear that their collective effect is to fatally
undermine the traditional understanding of the Lochner Court as
a fickle and ultimately unprincipled tribunal. One reason for
12. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
13. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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skepticism is that Whittington’s analysis suffers from what might
be called, for lack of a better label, a “selecting on the dependent
variable” problem. He spends a great deal of time explaining why
apparently countermajoritarian decisions invalidating federal
laws were either not really at odds with majority sentiment, or else
why the reforms in question were so obviously unconstitutional
(according to prevailing theories of constitutional interpretation)
that their sponsors should have expected to lose in court.
Meanwhile, decisions that upheld innovative federal regulations
are discussed only in passing, or else summarized in tables (pp.
166–171).
The reader is therefore left with a number of unanswered
questions: Were the reforms that survived the judicial gauntlet
less controversial from the standpoint of constitutional theory
than those that did not? Were they more likely to enjoy the
backing of mobilized electoral majorities or unified political
parties? Absent a serious effort to draw comparisons across cases
invalidating and upholding major reforms, it is hard to know
whether contemporaneous observers were really so misguided in
thinking that the Lochner-era justices were neither principled nor
pragmatic in their interactions with Congress.
II.
To be fair, Whittington’s aim in these chapters is not so much
to propose a comprehensive, predictive theory of judicial review
as it is to poke holes in some crucial, but rarely examined,
assumptions of the countermajoritarian framework. Moreover, an
in-depth discussion of the political and doctrinal contexts of every
federal measure reviewed by the early twentieth-century Court
would have caused an already-long book to balloon into a
multivolume work. Still, it is worth thinking briefly about what
this type of analysis might have revealed.
Were the two federal child labor laws, for example, so
obviously at odds with accepted federalism principles that their
supporters should have predicted their demise? Whittington
points out, correctly, that a number of commentators, including
President Wilson, expressed doubts about the constitutionality of
a federal child labor ban (p. 160).14 At least in Wilson’s case,
14. Whittington cites WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 177–178, 179, 187 (1908).
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however, the remarks in question predated a slew of Court
decisions that expanded Congress’s interstate commerce power
far beyond its nineteenth-century limits. In particular, the Court’s
1913 decision upholding the Mann Act—which banned the
interstate transportation of women for “immoral” purposes—
convinced many skeptics (including, apparently, Wilson) that the
commerce power could now reach any person or item that moved
across state lines.15 Such predictions turned out to be mistaken, as
a bare majority of the Court held in Hammer that this power did
not extend to products that were “of themselves . . . harmless.”16
But the larger question is why a group of justices motivated by a
principled commitment to dual federalism did not invalidate
earlier reforms, such as the Mann Act and the 1895 federal antilottery law, that provoked equally loud howls of protest from legal
commentators.17 If Whittington is right that the Court saw itself as
the conscience of the Republican regime—pointing lawmakers
back to the party’s founding principles when those principles were
temporarily jettisoned in the interest of partisan advantage—then
it should have acted decisively to rein in Congress’s commerce
power long before 1918. Its failure to do so created an
environment in which decisions such as Hammer, which
attempted to reassert the old boundaries, were almost certain to
be viewed as little more than fits of judicial pique.18
Of course, Whittington’s claim is not that the Lochner
Court’s decisions were uniformly principled. Rather, it is that the
Court acted on principle when political circumstances permitted,
reserving its principled stands for cases where the challenged
policy was of little interest to the public, or where the sponsoring
party was itself divided (pp. 172–173). But is it true that the
Lochner Court studiously avoided antagonizing “mobilized
political majorit[ies],” advancing its constitutional commitments
15. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL AND
BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910–21, VOL. 9 231–232 (1971).
16. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918).
17. GAINES M. FOSTER, MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865–1920, 144–145 (2002); JESSICA R.
PLILEY, POLICING SEXUALITY: THE MANN ACT AND THE MAKING OF THE FBI 67–75
(2014); Thomas M. Cooley, Taxation of Lotteries, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 69, Apr. 1892 at
523–534 (describing the constitutionally dubious nature of Congress’s attempts to reach
the lottery industry via its enumerated powers).
18. John W. Compton, Easing the Show Where It Pinches: The Lottery Case and the
Demise of Dual Federalism, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 133, 139–149 (2015).
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only “within the band of indifference established by other
political actors” (pp. 172, 9)?
Again, the two child labor decisions would seem to contradict
this claim, given that the anti-child labor movement, at its height,
was among the most potent reform movements in American
history. By the time of the Hammer decision, most non-Southern
states (as well as several Southern ones) had already banned child
labor, some via popular referenda that passed by overwhelming
margins.19 And although Southern manufacturers and a small
coterie of allied politicians continued to oppose federal child
labor laws, it is a stretch to say that the issue was a major cause of
schism within either party.20 By the time the Owen-Keating Act
was signed into law in 1916, both major parties had incorporated
support for a federal child labor ban into their platforms (as had
the Progressives).21 Six years later, when the Bailey decision made
clear that the Court would never permit Congress to reach child
labor via its enumerated powers, virtually the whole of American
civil society—including the nation’s largest membership groups
and religious denominations—lined up in support of a
constitutional amendment that would have overridden the
Court’s decision.22
Whittington acknowledges most of these facts, but concludes
that the Court could safely block federal child labor laws because
the “political costs” to current presidential administrations were
minimal (pp. 172–173). It is hard to know what to make of this
claim. When a proposed reform enjoys reasonably strong support
from both political parties, it is true that voters are unlikely to
punish the President’s party for an adverse Court decision. But
this insight makes the Court’s decision not to block earlier
expansions of Congress’s enumerated powers—many of which
enjoyed similarly strong bipartisan backing—all the more
19. Julie Novkov, Historicizing the Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle
over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369, 373 (2000); Child Labor
Bill: Hearings before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, H.R. 8234, 64th
Cong. (1916).
20. JOHN A. FLITER, CHILD LABOR IN AMERICA: THE EPIC LEGAL STRUGGLE TO
PROTECT CHILDREN 84–85, 87 (2018) (noting that most of the bill’s opponents were
“connected in some way to the Southern textile mills,” and that, in the Senate, the only
‘no’ votes came from ten Southern Senators, plus two Senators from Pennsylvania, ‘a state
with one of the highest rates of child labor’.”).
21. Id. at 81.
22. MOLLY LADD-TAYLOR, MOTHER-WORK: WOMEN, CHILD WELFARE, AND THE
STATE, 1890–1930 96 (1994).
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puzzling.
Moreover, from the perspective of the justices, the more
pressing concern in cases invalidating broadly popular laws would
seem to be how such decisions impact popular and elite
perceptions of the Court, not how they affect the fortunes of the
political parties. And in the case of the child labor decisions, the
damage to the Court’s prestige was significant. Not only did
Congress quickly authorize a constitutional amendment
overturning the Court’s decisions (which was ratified by twentyeight states before the New Deal-era constitutional revolution
made it irrelevant), but—more to the point—Hammer and Drexel
spawned an outpouring of academic and popular commentary
alleging that the Court’s federalism jurisprudence had become so
convoluted that it could only be regarded as a smokescreen for
the interests of big business.23 No doubt the Court’s critics would
have advanced such arguments even in the absence of the child
labor decisions, but the tortuous logic of Justice Day’s Hammer
opinion—which gamely attempted to square the Court’s suddenly
narrow view of the commerce power with a host of seemingly
incompatible precedents—made their task easier.24
The case for a cautiously principled Lochner Court becomes
even less compelling when one considers the many instances in
which the justices missed what in retrospect appear obvious
opportunities to reinforce threatened constitutional boundaries
by taking advantage of partisan fissures or public indifference. A
prime example is McCray v. U.S.,25 the 1904 decision that
effectively transformed Congress’s taxing power from a means of
revenue generation to a broader regulatory tool capable of
reaching subjects that were traditionally classified under the
states’ police powers. The case centered on a federal
oleomargarine tax, adopted in 1902, that was designed to shield
politically connected dairy producers from unwanted
competition. The brainchild of Republican lawmakers from New
England (whose states produced the bulk of the nation’s butter),
the tax drew stiff opposition from Southern Democrats, and also

23. Cf. Compton, supra note 18, at 146–148.
24. Cf. Thurlow M. Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32 HARV. L. REV. 45 (1918);
William Carey Jones, The Child Labor Decision, 6 CAL. L. REV. 395 (1918); Thomas Reed
Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3. S. L.
Q. 175 (1918).
25. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
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from a significant faction of Republicans who were either
connected to the oleomargarine industry or whose constituents
resented being asked to subsidize New England dairy producers.
Dozens of prominent Republicans, including the chair of the
relevant House committee, denounced the tax as
unconstitutional.26 Other party stalwarts, like Senator George
Frisbee Hoar, reluctantly supported it while warning that such an
obvious attempt to “usurp” the states’ police powers was unlikely
to survive judicial review.27 When the measure emerged from
committee, it sparked substantial opposition in the full House and
Senate, in the latter case barely surviving a motion to recommit.28
Given the fractured state of the parties and the lack of a
supportive popular majority, the Court had little reason to fear
that a decision reasserting a narrow interpretation of the taxing
power would provoke a political backlash. It is therefore
surprising—at least from the perspective of Whittington’s
framework—that the Court endorsed the measure’s
constitutionality in a 6–3 decision.
Nor was McCray the only missed opportunity. A similar
situation arose in 1913, when Congress, under pressure from
prohibitionists, made it a federal offense to ship liquor across state
lines with the intent of violating state law. Although the WebbKenyon Act passed a Democratic-controlled House and a
Republican-controlled Senate by comfortable margins, it sparked
intense opposition from constitutional Conservatives in the
Republican party, including President William Howard Taft and
Attorney General George Wickersham, who argued that the law
unconstitutionally delegated Congress’s commerce power to the
states, while also violating a longstanding norm mandating
uniformity in interstate commerce regulations. Taft ultimately
vetoed the measure, using his message to accuse Congress of
unilaterally “amend[ing]” the Commerce Clause.29 Congress then
overrode the veto, at which point the debate shifted to the courts.
Given that a Republican President well-versed in constitutional
questions had expressed deep reservations about the law, one
might expect a Court featuring seven Republican appointees (and

26. Herbert F. Marguiles, Federal Police Power by Taxation: McCray v. United States
and the Oleomargarine Tax of 1902, 5 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 1, 6 (1997).
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id. at 26.
29. FISS, supra note 6, at 287.
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four Taft appointees) to react with similar skepticism. Instead, the
Court handed down a 7–2 decision upholding the Webb-Kenyon
Act in its entirety, with Justice White, whom Taft had elevated to
the Chief Justiceship, penning a majority opinion whose doctrinal
pirouettes provided still more fodder for the Court’s Progressive
critics.30
III.
These examples call into question Whittington’s claim that
the Lochner-era justices hewed to “the straight and narrow path
of conservative constitutionalism,” wavering only in the face of
intense political pressure (p. 151). More broadly, they cast doubt
on his argument that the Lochner Court’s interactions with
Congress were fundamentally predictable. In fact, as many
contemporary observers pointed out, the defining feature of the
Court’s output in this period was its unpredictability. When
innovative federal laws appeared on the Court’s docket, no one
could say with certainty whether the justices would enforce
traditional constitutional limitations or acquiesce in the expansion
of federal regulatory capacities. In several pivotal cases,
essentially random occurrences, such as illnesses or recusals,
tipped the balance.31 And even in cases unaffected by such factors,
the lack of an ideological screening process for Court nominees
yielded a combustible mix of incompatible judicial philosophies
that made predicting outcomes all but impossible.32 It was this
sense of constant doctrinal flux, as much as the antidemocratic
30. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Cf.
Lindsay Rogers, Webb-Kenyon Decision, 4 VA. L. REV. 558 (1916–1917); Noel T.
Downing, Divesting and Article of Its Interstate Character: An Examination of the Doctrine
Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 100 (1920–1921); Samuel P. Orth,
Webb-Kenyon Law Decision, CORNELL L. Q. 283 (1916–1917).
31. Had Justice Gray not been forced from the bench by illness in 1902, the Court
might well have struck down the 1895 federal lottery law, thus limiting the scope of the
federal police power. Or had Justice Brandeis not recused himself in Stettler v. O’Hara,
243 U.S. 629 (1917), the Court likely would have delivered a clear affirmation of a state
minimum wage law in 1917, thus potentially leading to a different outcome in Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital.
32. Consider that President Theodore Roosevelt nominated such ideological
opposites as William Day (author of the majority opinion in Hammer) and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. (whose dissent in the same case was a rallying cry for Progressives), while
President Wilson nominated both James Clark McReynolds and Louis Brandeis. President
William Howard Taft managed to select a more ideologically coherent cohort of justices,
but the generally short tenures of his appointees blunted their impact on constitutional
doctrine.
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implications of the Court’s decisions, that formed the core of the
Progressive case against judicial authority.33
The importance of doctrinal stability was also a major,
though often overlooked, theme of Bickel’s Least Dangerous
Branch. The book’s argument that the Court should whenever
possible use “passive devices” to avoid resolving abstract
questions of constitutional authority was, to be sure, partly
motivated by worries about the Court’s democratic legitimacy (or
lack thereof).34 But it was also rooted in concerns about the
unintended and often destabilizing effects of sweeping
constitutional decisions like those that came to define the
Lochner Era. Durable constitutional norms, Bickel argued, could
only be articulated and sustained through an ongoing “colloquy”
between the judiciary and the other branches of government.35
When the Court closed off the interbranch conversation with
grand, principled pronouncements, it was writing checks it could
not cash; lacking the support of powerful political actors, the
resulting norms would be fragile, if not altogether unenforceable;
and their purported permanence and universality would leave the
Court with no obvious means of retreat in the event that they
proved unworkable, or were twisted to purposes not envisioned
by their authors. For Bickel, judicial modesty was not only a
means for maximizing democratic accountability; it was also a way
of rendering the constitutional system more stable and
predictable—and hence more “morally supportable.”36
Repugnant Laws is a groundbreaking work, and the data on
which it is based will prove invaluable to scholars of judicial
politics. Whittington also deserves much credit for pointing the
way toward a more nuanced understanding of the Supreme
Court’s relationship to political parties and electoral coalitions.
And yet, in the end, readers inclined to view strong-form judicial
review as a deviant force in the constitutional system are unlikely
to derive much comfort from his concluding observation that the
Court has typically reserved its fire for statutes that were the
33. As Edward Corwin wrote in an article documenting the twists and turns of
Commerce Clause doctrine in the 1910s and 1920s, conflicting precedents concerning the
scope of Congress’s authority were so abundant that, depending on which “horse” the
Court chose to “saddle,” it could push doctrine in any “direction it wishes to ride.” Edward
S. Corwin, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES’ RIGHTS 167, 248–249 (1934).
34. BICKEL, supra, note 3, at 206.
35. Id. at 156.
36. Id. at 20.
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products of “legislative logrolling, special-interest rent seeking,
legislative ineptitude, . . . or political grandstanding,” (pp. 301–
302). Pointing out that Congress, too, is capable of subverting the
“will of the people” is not the same as explaining why Americans
should celebrate an institution whose interventions in the
policymaking process have, historically speaking, been both
highly unpredictable and very difficult to reverse. Or, as Bickel
put the point, “impurities and imperfections . . . in one part of the
system are no argument for total departure from the desired norm
in another part.”37

37. Id.

